The right of a director to participate in the management of a company: Kaimowitz v Delahunt 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) by Cassim, Rehana
− − − − −
THE RIGHT OF A DIRECTOR TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A
COMPANY: KAIMOWITZ V DELAHUNT
2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC)
REHANA CASSIM
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of South Africa, Pretoria
Attorney and Notary Public of the High Court of South Africa
I INTRODUCTION
Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act) empowers
the board of directors of a company to manage the business and affairs of
a company, save to the extent that the Companies Act or the company’s
Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) provides otherwise. While this
provision may at first blush appear unexceptional, it is far from it!
Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act is an innovative provision in the 2008 Act
in that, for the first time in South Africa’s corporate law history, the
Companies Act has conferred a statutory power and responsibility to
manage the business and affairs of the company on the board of
directors. In Kaimowitz v Delahunt 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) the Western
Cape Division of the High Court in Cape Town (the court) was
confronted with an important question regarding section 66(1) of the
2008 Act: to what extent do the powers of a company director include
involvement in the day-to-day management of a company’s business?
This note critically analyses the judgment, explores some of the implica-
tions of section 66(1) of the 2008 Act, and addresses the relevant
employment-law aspects of this case arising from the applicant being
both a director and an employee of the company.
II THE FACTS
The applicant was one of five directors of a company. He was also a
full-time employee, and an executive director of the company. In May
2016, the applicant received a letter from the company stating that he
would no longer be employed by the company. The letter stated that
while the applicant would remain a director of the company, his status
would now be that of a non-executive director. The applicant was
further informed in the letter that he would be entitled to exercise all his
rights as a director as provided in both the 2008 Act and the company’s
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MoI. It asserted that while the applicant could still attend all directors’
meetings, he would no longer be entitled to participate in any manage-
ment meetings by virtue of the termination of his employment, and,
further, that he would no longer be involved in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the company’s business.
As a result of his exclusion from the daily management of the
company’s business, the applicant launched legal proceedings against
the company and its directors. He contended that his dismissal as an
employee had been unlawful — a contention which, at the time of the
judgment, was the subject of a dispute before the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA), and was not a
matter before the court. In the proceedings before the court, the
applicant sought an order in terms of section 163 of the 2008 Act, which
empowers a director to apply to court for relief from oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial conduct. The applicant wished to restrain the
directors of the company from barring, interfering with, or in any way
preventing him from taking part in the management of the company’s
business for so long as he remained a director of the company. He
further required the board of directors to give him reasonable prior
written notice of all management meetings relevant to the business and
the affairs of the company. He also requested an order directing that, for
so long as he was a director of the company, the directors hold
bi-monthly management meetings with him. The applicant also sought
an order interdicting and restraining the board of directors and the
company from taking any steps which would interfere with his power to
take part in the management of the company’s business while he was a
director of the company.
The applicant’s claim that the conduct of the directors was oppressive
and unfairly prejudicial to him, was based on his claim that the directors
had acted contrary to section 66(1) of the 2008 Act by creating the post
of non-executive director for him. This action, the applicant argued,
prevented him from fulfilling his lawful obligations as a director, which,
he contended, included the management of the company. By virtue of
section 66(1) of the 2008 Act, and despite his tenure as an employee of
the company having been terminated, the applicant contended that he
was entitled, as of right, to participate in the day-to-day business of the
company.
The question before the court was whether the applicant was entitled
as of right to participate in the day-to-day management of the compa-
ny’s affairs and whether the conduct of the company and the board of
directors had indeed been oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to him.
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The court was consequently required to determine the extent to which
the powers of a director include involvement in the day-to-day manage-
ment of a company’s business.
III THE JUDGMENT
Davis J held that the overall supervision of the management of a
company resides in its board of directors (as opposed to individual
directors) which may delegate the management powers to a managing
director and/or to a committee of the board (paras 21 and 27). In
coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the Australian cases of
Daniels (formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v Anderson
(1995) 16 ACSR 607 (Daniels v Anderson), and Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717 (ASIC v Healey). The
judge found that the involvement of a director in the affairs of the
company must be assessed in terms of enabling that director to perform
the duties falling to him as a result of his appointment as a director (para
26). Therefore, each director does not necessarily have to be involved in
the day-to-day running of a company’s business; nor does each director
have to sit on every board committee (para 26). It follows, the court said,
that a director is not, as of right, entitled to participate in the day-to-day
running of the company’s affairs (para 26). Davis J accordingly held that
the applicant was not entitled to attend the management meetings (as
opposed to board meetings) of the company.
In light of this finding by the court, it was held that the only relief to
which the applicant was entitled, would be in terms of any act performed
by the board of directors of the company which had undermined,
prevented, or reduced his ability to perform his functions as a director of
the company (para 27). The court found that the applicant had not
made out a case that the actions of the board of directors had impeded or
obstructed his capacity to act as a director and to fulfil his fiduciary
responsibilities to the company (para 34). The application for relief
under section 163 of the 2008 Act was consequently rejected.
IV ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Source of director’s power under the 2008 Act
Until the end of the nineteenth century it was generally accepted that the
general meeting was the personification and supreme organ of the
company, and that the directors were simply its agents subject to the
control of the company in general meeting (Isle of Wight Railway Co v
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Tahourdin (1883) 25 Ch D 320 (CA); Davies & Worthington, Gower &
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 10 ed (Sweet & Maxwell
2016) 358; Blackman, Jooste, Everingham et al, Commentary on the
Companies Act vol 2 (Juta 2002 revision service 9, 2012) 7–14). Since the
powers conferred upon the directors (as agents) were regarded as having
been conferred upon them by the shareholders (as principals), it was
deduced that the directors were subject to the control of the sharehold-
ers in general meeting (Blackman, Jooste, Everingham et al, 7–14). The
implication of this view was that the shareholders could at any time by
ordinary resolution give the directors instructions on how they were to
exercise their powers of management (Davies & Worthington, 358).
Under the repealed Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Act) the
power to manage the company’s affairs had to be delegated to the board
of directors by the shareholders in general meeting, or by the articles of
association of the company (art 59 of Table A, the articles for a public
company having a share capital; and art 60 of Table B, the articles for a
private company having a share capital). If no powers were granted to
the board of directors through the articles of association, the board
would be powerless to act and the company could act only through its
shareholders. Directors, therefore, had no original powers. Section 66(1)
of the 2008 Act has now firmly swung the pendulum towards the board
of directors as the supreme organ of the company. The section states as
follows:
The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the
direction of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers
and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the extent that
this Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides
otherwise.
With the enactment of section 66(1) of the 2008 Act, original power to
manage the business and affairs of the company has, for the first time,
been given to the board of directors by statute. The power of the
directors is no longer a power delegated by the shareholders through the
constitution of the company. As the High Court affirmed in Pretorius v
PB Meat (Pty) Ltd (1057/2013) [2013] ZAWCHC 89 (14 June 2013) para
25 and Navigator Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing
Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd [2014] JOL 32101 (WCC) para 31, in terms of
the 2008 Act, the ultimate power in a company now rests with the board
of directors and not the shareholders (unless otherwise provided in the
2008 Act or the company’s MoI).
The effect of section 66(1) of the 2008 Act is that the statute itself
allocates the powers of management to the board of directors as a whole,
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save to the extent that the 2008 Act or the company’s MoI provides
otherwise. The MoI may be amended by the shareholders by means of a
special resolution or, if necessary, by complying with any different
requirements set out in the MoI (s 16(1) and (2) of the 2008 Act). The
shareholders are therefore not without power, and they may curtail the
powers of the board of directors in the MoI. Interestingly, there are
limitations to the exercise of this power by the shareholders in that: (i) a
special resolution to amend the MoI must be proposed by shareholders
entitled to exercise at least ten per cent of the voting rights that may be
exercised on the resolution (s 16(1)(c)(i)(bb)); (ii) the threshold for
passing a special resolution may be increased in terms of section 65(10)
of the 2008 Act (s 65(10)); and (iii) in terms of section 16(2) of the 2008
Act, more onerous requirements to amend a company’s MoI may be
specified in the MoI than those specified in section 16(1)(c)(i). There-
fore, while the shareholders do have the power to curtail the powers of
the board of directors in the MoI and to amend the MoI in order to do
so, there are some limitations on their exercise of this power.
In contrast to the 2008 Act, the Companies Act of 2006 of the United
Kingdom (the UK Companies Act of 2006) contains no provision
conferring management or decision-making power on the board of
directors. Instead, it is left to the constitution of the company to
determine the distribution of decision-making power between the board
of directors and the shareholders (see arts 3 and 4 of the Model Articles
for Private Companies Limited by Shares and the Model Articles for
Public Companies). This is known as the ‘contractarian model’, or
‘English-model companies’, or ‘memorandum and articles’ model of
companies (see Welling, Smith & Rotman, Canadian Corporate Law
Cases, Notes & Materials 4 ed (LexisNexis 2010) 114; Kershaw, Company
Law in Context 2 ed (OUP Oxford 2012) 85–93; and Oosthuizen &
Delport, ‘Rectification of the securities register of a company and the
oppression remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228 at 232–233). In terms of the
UK Companies Act of 2006, the constitution of a company is to be
treated as a contract between all of the shareholders and the company
itself (s 33(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 which states that the
provisions of a company’s constitution bind the company and its
members to the same extent as if they were covenants on the part of the
company and of each member to observe those provisions. See further
Welling, Smith & Rotman, 115; Davies & Worthington, 58–59; and
Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political
Foundations of Shareholder Power (Cambridge University Press 2013)
35–36). The managerial power of the board of directors in the UK does
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not, therefore, arise from statute and is not an original power, but is
delegated by the shareholders through the constitution of the company,
and is derivative of a contract (Welling, Smith & Rotman, 115; Kershaw,
191–192; Bruner, 36). The originating power of the company in the UK
therefore lies with the shareholders and not with the directors. It is,
accordingly, a shareholder-centric approach (Bruner, 32).
In sharp contrast to the position in the UK, under the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act 1984 (the MBCA) of the United States of
America (USA) the power to manage the company is conferred on the
board of directors by statute. Section 8–01(b) of the MBCA states that
corporate powers are exercised by or under the authority of the board of
directors, and that the business and affairs of the corporation are
managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. It is clear
that the powers of the directors flow from the statute itself. This
approach also retains flexibility in respect of the constitution in that the
default rules may be changed by the company’s constitution (s 2.20(b) of
the MBCA). In similar vein, section 141(a) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law states that the ‘business and affairs of every corpora-
tion ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.’ This approach is known as the ‘division-of-powers’
model because the statute expressly divides powers within the corporate
constitution between shareholders and directors (see Welling, Smith &
Rotman, 116–117; Davies & Worthington, 59; and Bruner, 36–65 for a
further discussion of this model).
Likewise, under section 198A of the Australian Corporations Act of
2001 the management of the business of a company is a matter for the
company’s directors. Section 198A(1) states that the business of a
company is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors.
Section 198A(1) is a replaceable or alterable rule, meaning that it may be
ousted or modified by the constitution of the company. As is the
position under section 66(1) of the 2008 Act, under section 198A(2) of
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the powers of the directors may
be curtailed by the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 or by the
company’s constitution. Despite the presence of section 198A(1) in the
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, this statute is to a large degree
shareholder-centric, as is the position under company law in the UK in
which Australian company law is historically rooted (a detailed discus-
sion of the approach adopted in Australia is beyond the scope of this
note, but see Bruner, 66–77 and Austin & Ramsay, Ford, Austin and
Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law 16 ed (LexisNexis 2015) para
1.020).
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To sum up, the essential difference between the contractarian and the
division-of-powers models, is that the former model is shareholder-
centric and leaves the distribution of decision-making power between
the board of directors and the shareholders to the constitution of the
company, while the latter model is director-centric and expressly, in the
statute, apportions powers between the directors and the shareholders.
In essence, the 2008 Act appears to have moved away from the
contractarian model to the division-of-powers model. The allocation of
powers is now sourced in legislation via section 66(1) of the 2008 Act,
save where it is changed by the 2008 Act or by the MoI of the company
(see Kaimowitz v Delahunt para 13; Cassim et al, Contemporary Com-
pany Law 2 ed (Juta 2012) 124; Delport, Henochsberg on the Companies
Act 71 of 2008 (LexisNexis 2011) (revision service 16, 2018) 250(3); Esser
& Delport, ‘Shareholder protection philosophy in terms of the Compa-
nies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1 at 9 and Oosthuizen & Delport,
(2017) 80 THRHR 228 at 244). It is however arguable that to some extent
the 2008 Act has adopted a hybrid model in that it does retain certain
elements of the contractarian model (see Oosthuizen & Delport, (2017)
80 THRHR 228 at 245). For instance, section 15(6) of the 2008 Act,
which is analogous to section 33(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006,
provides that a company’s MoI and any rules of the company are
binding between the company and each shareholder. Section 15(6) of
the 2008 Act goes further than section 33(1) of the UK Companies Act of
2006, in that it provides that the company’s MoI is also binding between
or among the shareholders of the company, and between the company
and each director or prescribed officer of the company or any other
person serving the company as a member of a board committee, in the
exercise of their respective functions within the company. The fact that
the power of the board of directors is now sourced in the 2008 Act does
not mean that the statute does not confer any powers on the company’s
shareholders. For example, section 71(1) of the 2008 Act gives share-
holders the power to remove directors from office by means of an
ordinary resolution, without cause, and despite anything to the contrary
in the company’s MoI, or any agreement between the company and a
director, or between any shareholders and a director. This power reflects
the shareholder-oriented governance system in the UK (see Bruner,
29–30). A detailed discussion of the division of powers between the
directors and shareholders of a company under the 2008 Act is beyond
the scope of this note, but see Esser & Delport, ‘Shareholder protection
philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR
1 at 8–14 for a further discussion of this issue.
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(b) The entitlement of a director to be involved in the
day-to-day running of the company’s affairs
As stated above, in Kaimowitz v Delahunt the court relied on the
Australian case of Daniels v Anderson to hold that a director does not
have a right to be involved in the day-to-day running of the company’s
business (para 19). In Daniels v Anderson the New South Wales Court of
Appeal stated that ‘[d]irectorial management does not require a detailed
inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of
corporate affairs and policies’ (667). In ASIC v Healey the Federal Court
of Australia endorsed this sentiment and asserted that ‘[d]irectors are
required to take reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to
guide and monitor the management of the company’ (para 166). Relying
on these dicta, Davis J held that the description of the role of a director in
Daniels v Anderson serves to illustrate that the day-to-day management
of a company may be delegated to a managing director and/or to
committees of the board as chosen by the board, as opposed to each
individual director, as of right, having the power to involve him- or
herself in the day-to-day operations of the company (para 21).
Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act is worded very similarly to section
198A(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 which states that the
‘business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the
directors’ (my emphasis). It has been said that the words ‘managed by
the directors’ are potentially misleading since boards of directors,
particularly in large companies, can do little more than supervise and
monitor the performance of the managers who make business decisions
(Austin & Ford, para 7.091).
Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act is notably also worded very similarly to
section 8.01(b) of the MBCA, which states that ‘the business and affairs
of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, [my
emphasis] and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.’
Section 8.01(b) of the MBCA was amended in 1974 to include the words
‘or under the direction of’ the board of directors. The reason for the
amendment was due to increasing concern that the traditional words
‘managed by the board of directors’ could be interpreted to mean that
directors were required to become involved in the detailed day-to-day
administration of the company’s affairs (see Model Business Corpora-
tion Act Annotated 4 ed vol 2 (American Bar Association 2013) 8–9). It
was recognised that, at least for public companies, this language did not
accurately describe the role of directors (see Olson & Briggs, ‘The Model
Business Corporation Act and corporate governance: An enabling
statute moves towards normative standards’ (2011) 74 Law and Contem-
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porary Problems 31 at 32). In order to eliminate any ambiguity as to the
director’s role in formulating management policy, as opposed to direct
involvement in the day-to-day management of companies, the wording
was amended to include the words ‘under the direction of’ the board of
directors. The MBCA went further in 2005 and inserted the phrase
‘subject to the oversight’ of the board of directors in section 8.01(b) of
the MBCA. These words were inserted in section 8.01(b) of the MBCA in
order to reflect a contemporaneous amendment to section 8.30(b) of the
MBCA (dealing with the standards of conduct for directors) in order to
differentiate between the board’s decision-making functions and its
oversight functions (see Model Business Corporation Act Annotated
8–10).
The power conferred on the board of directors under section 66(1) of
2008 Act extends to both the ‘business’ and the ‘affairs’ of the company.
It is broader than the previous article 59 of Table A and article 60 of
Table B under the 1973 Act, which referred only to directors managing
the ‘business’ of the company (Havenga, ‘Directors’ exploitation of
corporate opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2013)
TSAR 258 at 262). In Ex Parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd 1987 (1) SA
33 (D) 36–37, Didcott J drew a distinction between the power to control
the business of a company and the power to control its affairs, and stated
that the power to manage the ‘affairs’ of the company is a wider concept
than the power to manage the company’s business alone (37). (See
further Ex parte New Seasons Auto Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 341
(W) 345, where the court agreed with this interpretation by Didcott J.)
As the 2008 Act has, in the main, moved away from the contractarian
model to the division-of-powers model, and as section 66(1) of the 2008
Act is worded very similarly to section 198A(1) of the Australian
Corporations Act of 2001 and section 8.01(b) of the MBCA, it is
submitted that the interpretation of the phrase ‘by or under the
direction’ of the board of directors under both these foreign Acts, as
discussed above, is of persuasive authority in South African law. This
submission is bolstered by section 5(2) of the 2008 Act, which states that,
to the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or applying the 2008 Act
may consider foreign law. In this regard, it is submitted that, in
agreement with Kaimowitz v Delahunt, under section 66(1) of the 2008
Act, the board of directors is not required to be involved in the
day-to-day management of the company’s affairs but rather should play
a monitoring role over the management of the company. It follows that
an individual director does not have a right or entitlement to be involved
in the day-to-day management of the company’s business.
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This finding in Kaimowitz v Delahunt is in harmony with section 7(j)
of the 2008 Act. This provision states that one of the purposes of the 2008
Act is to encourage the efficient and responsible management of
companies. It is submitted that as it is impractical for the board of
directors as a whole directly and actively to manage the day-to-day
business and affairs of a company — particularly a large company — it is
indeed efficient and responsible for the board to adopt a monitoring role
over the management of the company, and to delegate the running of the
day-to-day business and affairs of the company to an individual director,
such as a managing director.
The fact that directors may delegate the day-to-day management of
the company’s affairs is bolstered by section 72(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.
This section provides that, save to the extent that the company’s MoI
provides otherwise, the board may delegate any of its authority to any
committee. Additionally, in the context of the business-judgment rule in
section 76(4) of the 2008 Act, section 76(4)(b)(i)(bb) provides that a
director is entitled to rely on the performance by any of the persons to
whom the board may reasonably have delegated, formally or informally
by course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or more of
the board’s functions which may be delegated under applicable law. This
notwithstanding, while directors may delegate their functions, there are
limitations on their power of delegation in that total abrogation is not
permitted as directors must supervise the discharge of the delegated
functions and they may not delegate responsibility for the task in
question (see s 76(3) of the 2008 Act; Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1
BCLC 433 (ChD); Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (Juta
2012) 561 and Delport, Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008
250(5) for a further discussion of this principle).
Since the power to manage the company’s business vests in the board
of directors as a whole, as opposed to individual directors, in assessing
the role and involvement of a particular director in a company it must be
determined what powers to manage the day-to-day affairs of the
company have been specifically delegated to him or her by the board of
directors. In this regard, the King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa 2016 (the King IV Report) usefully suggests that delegation
to an individual member of the board of directors should be recorded in
writing and approved by the board (para 41 at 54 of the King IV Report.
See also principle 8 of the King IV Report on the board’s power of
delegation). It is further suggested that the record should set out the
nature and extent of the responsibilities delegated, the decision-making
authority, the duration of the delegation, and the delegate’s reporting
responsibilities (para 41 at 54 of the King IV Report).
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It was affirmed by the High Court in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Limited
(08/20980) [2014] ZAGPJHC 135 (1 July 2014) para 166, that individual
directors have only the authority that the board delegates to them, or
that is delegated to them by someone authorised to do so. In Kaimowitz v
Delahunt the applicant had been informed that by virtue of the
termination of his employment, he would no longer be entitled to attend
management meetings. The right to attend to the day-to-day manage-
ment of the company had, therefore, not been delegated to the applicant.
As the applicant was unable to establish that the directors of the
company had obstructed his capacity to act as a director or to fulfil his
duties, it is submitted that the court correctly dismissed his application
based on section 163 of the 2008 Act. While the decision in Kaimowitz v
Delahunt is useful in clarifying the roles of boards of directors and of
individual directors, the practical effect of the judgment would depend
on the outcome of the applicant’s dismissal dispute before the CCMA.
This is discussed below.
(c) Directors as employees of the company
The dismissal of the applicant as an employee of the company was, at the
time of this judgment, subject to a dispute before the CCMA the
outcome of which could have a substantial impact on the applicant’s
position in the company.
Executive directors are full-time employees of the company, while
non-executive directors occupy the office of director but are not
employees of the company (Protect a Partner (Pty) Ltd v Laura Machaba-
Abiodun [2013] JOL 31048 (LC) para 48). A person simultaneously
employed as an executive director and a board member holds two
distinct positions (Kaimowitz v Delahunt para 19). Since executive
directors enjoy a dual status as directors and employees of the company,
they enjoy the protection of both the Companies Act and the Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA). (See PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo
NO & others (2004) 25 ILJ 2366 (LC) para 29; Amazwi Power Products
(Pty) Ltd v Turnbull (2008) 29 ILJ 2554 (LAC) para 15; and SA Post Office
Ltd v Mampeule (2010) 31 ILJ 2051 (LAC) para 21.) As directors they are
governed by the provisions of the Companies Act, and as employees they
are governed by the provisions of the LRA (Chillibush Communications
(Pty) Ltd v Johnston (2010) 31 ILJ 1358 para 24). Consequently, when an
executive director is removed from office, the provisions of both the
2008 Act and the LRA must be considered in the removal process
(Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull (2008) 29 ILJ 2554 (LAC)
para 15; Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC)
(2018) 30 SA MERC LJ182
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(2008/18386) 2008 ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008); Wicks v SA
Independent Services (Pty) Ltd [2010] JOL 25715 (WCC); Chillibush
Communications (Pty) Ltd v Johnston (2010) 31 ILJ 1358 (LC); and SA
Post Office Ltd v Mampeule (2010) 31 ILJ 2051 (LAC)). A distinction
must, therefore, be drawn between the removal of a director from office
as a director of the company, and the removal of a director from his
position as an employee of the company. As an executive director enjoys
the protection of both the 2008 Act and the LRA if the board of directors
wishes to withdraw certain of his or her functions and powers and
downscale his or her position on the board to that of a non-executive
director — as occurred in Kaimowitz v Delahunt — it must follow the
proper procedures under the LRA in lawfully dismissing the executive
director as an employee.
It is not clear from the facts whether the board of directors in
Kaimowitz v Delahunt did indeed follow the proper procedures under
the LRA when it dismissed the applicant as an employee. As mentioned,
the dismissal of the applicant as an employee of the company was the
subject of a dispute before the CCMA. Should it transpire that the
applicant was not lawfully dismissed as an employee, it would mean that
the change in his status by the board of directors from that of executive
director to non-executive director, may not have been lawfully executed.
If a company dismisses a former executive director as an employee
and his or her dismissal is found to have been unfair under the LRA, he
or she is entitled to rely on the remedies under the LRA. He or she is
consequently entitled to claim reinstatement, reemployment, or com-
pensation for the unfair dismissal (s 193(1) of the LRA). Section 193(2)
of the LRA obliges the court or arbitrator to order that an unfairly
dismissed employee be reinstated or reemployed, unless the following
applies: (i) the employee does not wish to be reinstated or reemployed;
(ii) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a contin-
ued employment relationship would be intolerable; (iii) it is not
reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate or reemploy the
employee; or (iv) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did
not follow a fair procedure. In PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO &
others (2004) ILJ 2366 (LC) para 29, the Labour Court cast doubt on
whether an executive director is entitled to reinstatement because of the
dual capacities in which he holds office. While reinstatement may be
more difficult with regard to executive directors, this does not mean that
in appropriate circumstances a court would not order the reinstatement
of an unfairly dismissed director in his capacity as an employee.
In Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8
ILJ 356 (IC), for example, the former Industrial Court reinstated a
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financial director of a company as an employee on the ground that his
dismissal as an employee had been substantively and procedurally
unfair. The court found that the financial director’s position in his
capacity as an employee could be distinguished from his capacity as a
director (362). It consequently reinstated him retrospectively on terms
and conditions no less favourable to him than those he had enjoyed
before his termination. In Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO 1987
(4) SA 702 (N) — an application for a review of a decision of the
Industrial Court — the High Court found that a managing director of
the company was an employee of the company who had been unfairly
dismissed. The court upheld the reinstatement of the unfairly dismissed
managing director to his employment position within the company. It
should be noted that the former managing director was reinstated only
to his position of employment, and not to his position as a director of the
company.
Even though it may be complicated to reinstate executive directors in
the company because of the dual capacities in which they hold office, the
above cases show that the courts may nonetheless reinstate executive
directors as employees in the company if they have been unfairly
dismissed as employees. Their capacities as employees must be capable
of being separated from their capacities as directors. It is not always
practical strictly to separate the two positions held by an executive
director, or consistently to apply a strict separation of such positions
(Stoop, ‘The company director as employee’ (2011) 32 ILJ 2367 at 2371;
Cassim, ‘The division and balance of power between the board of
directors and the shareholders: the removal of directors’ (2013) 29(1)
Banking and Finance Law Review 151 at 168). It may be that the two
positions of director and employee are so interlinked that the person’s
capacity as a director cannot logically be separated from his capacity as
an employee (Van Eck & Lombard, ‘Dismissal of executive directors:
comparing principles of company law and labour law’ (2004) 1 TSAR 20
at 35).
If an employee is not reinstated or reemployed, he or she may claim
compensation from the employer for unfair dismissal under section 193
of the LRA. This compensation must be just and equitable, but may not
exceed the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration calculated at the
employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal (s 194(1) of the
LRA). In addition, the former executive director may, in his capacity as
an employee, claim common-law damages for breach of contract over
and above the compensation available under the LRA (s 195(1) of the
LRA and Fedlife Insurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA) paras 22
and 24).
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To return to Kaimowitz v Delahunt, it follows from the discussion
above, that if the CCMA were to find the applicant’s dismissal as an
employee unlawful, he could possibly be reinstated to his position as an
employee and hence to his position as an executive director of the
company. Such an order would not be made if: the applicant does not
wish to be reinstated or to be reemployed; if a continued employment
relationship would be intolerable; if it is not reasonably practicable for
the company to reinstate or reemploy the applicant as an employee, or if
the dismissal is found to be unfair only because the company did not
follow a fair procedure in dismissing the applicant. If the dismissal is
found to have been unfair and the applicant is not reinstated or
reemployed by the company, he or she may claim up to 12 months’
remuneration from the company, as well as common-law damages for a
breach of contract, if applicable.
Undoubtedly, the consequences of failing to terminate the employ-
ment of an executive director in a substantially and procedurally fair
manner are severe for a company. The onus rests on the employer to
prove that the dismissal was fair (s 192(2) of the LRA). It is consequently
vitally important for a company to take cognisance of the applicable
labour-law principles and to follow them when dismissing an executive
director as an employee. Before dismissing an executive director as an
employee of the company, the board of directors should take heed of the
role which the director plays in the company as an employee, whether
his position as an employee and as a director may be separated, and the
consequences for the company if the director is removed from office as
an employee but not as a director. The board must also consider whether
it will be practical to retain the former employee as a non-executive
director, particularly if there has been a breakdown in the relationship
between the director and the company.
(d) Removal of a director from office
In Kaimowitz v Delahunt the applicant asserted in a supplementary
replying affidavit that the directors of the company ‘took it upon
themselves, from circa March 2016 to ‘‘put the old bull to pasture’’’ (para
7 of the judgment). It appears that the applicant was of the view that
because of his advanced age the directors wished to remove him from the
company, at least as an executive director.
Under section 68(1) of the 2008 Act a director of a profit company
may be elected to serve for an indefinite term, or for a term set out in the
MoI. If the MoI does not specify a term of office, or does not implement
a rotational system for the terms of office of directors, a director may be
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appointed to the board of directors for an indefinite term. This means
that if a company no longer wishes to have a particular executive director
who is nearing retirement age on its board of directors, it must persuade
him or her to resign, failing which either the board of directors or the
shareholders would have to remove the director from office.
Under section 71(1) of the 2008 Act, shareholders of a company may
at any time remove a director from office by an ordinary resolution
adopted at a shareholders’ meeting. Shareholders are not required to
have a reason to remove a director from office. If the shareholders of a
company fail to remove a particular director from office, the board itself,
under section 71(3) of the 2008 Act, may remove him or her. The board
of directors may, however, remove a fellow board member from office
only under grounds specified in section 71(3)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Act.
These grounds are that: the person is ineligible or disqualified to be a
director; is incapacitated; or has neglected or been derelict in the
performance of the functions of director. The board of directors would
have to prove that any of these grounds are present before they may
remove a fellow board member from office. For instance, if the board
alleges that a director is incapacitated, it would have to prove this, and
further that the director is incapacitated to the extent that he or she is
unable to perform the functions of a director, and, additionally, that the
director is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time (see
s 71(3)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act). A director who has been removed from
office by the board of directors on one of these grounds (or any person
who appointed that director as contemplated in s 66(4)(a)(i) of the 2008
Act) may apply to court within 20 business days to review the board’s
determination to remove the director from office (s 71(5) of the 2008
Act). It is therefore imperative that the board firmly establish that a
proper ground for the removal of a director is present before removing a
fellow board member from office.
In terms of section 69(6)(a) of the 2008 Act, the MoI may impose
additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification on directors. If a
company is concerned about any director who has been appointed for
an indefinite term reaching retirement age, it may insert in its MoI, as an
additional ground of disqualification, that when a director reaches a
specific age, he or she will be disqualified from holding office as a
director. A company may even allow its board of directors to extend the
retirement age of a director by stating in its MoI that the board of
directors has a discretion to extend the retirement age for a specific
director. Such a provision ensures that when a director has been
appointed for an indefinite term, he or she would be compelled to resign
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as a director upon reaching a specific age on the ground that he or she no
longer qualifies to be a director. This would circumvent the complica-
tions arising from the shareholders having to remove a director from
office under section 71(1), or the board of directors having to do so
under section 71(3) of the 2008 Act, or, as occurred in Kaimowitz v
Delahunt, terminating the employment of an executive director and
thereby reducing his status to that of a non-executive director.
V CONCLUSION
Kaimowitz v Delahunt is a key decision in South African company law as
it clarifies the role of a director under section 66(1) of the 2008 Act. The
interpretation of section 66(1) in Kaimowitz v Delahunt accords with the
interpretation of the equivalent provisions in the Australian Corpora-
tions Act of 2001 and the MBCA. This note has argued, concurring with
Kaimowitz v Delahunt, that under section 66(1) of the 2008 Act, the
board of directors is not required to be engaged in the day-to-day
management of the company’s affairs. It must, however, monitor the
management of the company. An individual director is not, as of right,
entitled to participate in the day-to-day management of the company’s
business. The outcome of this judgment accords with section 7(j) of the
2008 Act, which provides that one of the purposes of the 2008 Act is to
encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies.
This note has emphasised that the outcome of the applicant’s
dismissal dispute before the CCMA may have an impact on the practical
application of the judgment and on the applicant’s position in the
company. Some of the practical consequences of failing to terminate the
employment of an executive director in a substantially and procedurally
fair manner have also been highlighted. In light of these severe conse-
quences, this note identifies some important considerations that should
be taken into account by the board of directors before dismissing an
executive director as an employee of a company.
Finally, some provisions that a company may consider inserting in its
MoI if it is concerned about having to retain directors on its board of
directors once they reach retirement age in instances where directors
have been appointed for an indefinite term, are suggested. These
provisions would circumvent the complication attendant upon having
to remove a director from office under sections 71(1) or 71(3) of the
2008 Act, or of terminating the employment of an executive director and
downgrading his or her status to that of a non-executive director, as
occurred in Kaimowitz v Delahunt.
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